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Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat:
Stand Your Ground, Battered Women's
Syndrome, and Violence as
Male Privilege
MARY ANNE FRANKS*
Proponents of Stand Your Ground laws cynically exploit the image of
vulnerable women to defend expansions of self-defense doctrine, despite
the fact that such laws actually reinforce and exacerbate existing gender
divides in self-defense law that disproportionately harm women. The
appropriation of women's right to self-defense by Stand Your Ground
supporters masks the law's hostility toward women's use of force and
obscures the real achievement of such legislation: the normalization and
promotion of (often white) male violence in an ever-expanding variety of
scenarios. Battered Women's Syndrome, the chief narrative available to
women who fight back, forces women to plead for mercy and subjects
their behavior to extensive scrutiny and evaluation. Stand Your Ground,
the chief narrative men can now use to justify provoking deadly fights,
often allows men to escape evaluation altogether by granting immunity
from prosecution and even from arrest. This two-track system of self-
defense-Battered Women's Syndrome for women and Stand Your
Ground for men-has far-reaching implications outside of the court-
room. Battered Women's Syndrome sends the legal and social message
that women should retreat even from their own homes in the face of
objective, repeated harm to their bodies; Stand Your Ground sends the
legal and social message that men can advance against strangers any-
where on the basis of vague, subjective perceptions of threats. Male vio-
lence is not only tolerated, but celebrated; women's violence is not only
discouraged, but stigmatized. Invoking the image of vulnerable women
to promote aggressive self-defense rhetoric serves to distract from the
reality that violence remains chiefly a male privilege.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Republican politicians and candidates made headlines during the
2012 election season for making unsympathetic, offensive, and inaccu-
rate comments about rape. From Todd Akin's infamous assertion that
women rarely get pregnant as a result of "legitimate" rape because "the
female body has ways to try to shut the whole thing down" to Paul Ryan
calling rape "a method of conception," Republicans were widely criti-
cized for trivializing and defending sexual assault.' The flurry of ill-
advised public statements prompted observant commentators to note that
Republican antipathy to rape victims has been characteristic of the party
long before 2012.2 An example that has recently come to light is Maine
Representative Lawrence Lockman's statement from 1990 that if abor-
tion is legal, it's only fair to allow men to rape women: "If a woman has
[the right to an abortion], why shouldn't a man be free to use his supe-
rior strength to force himself on a woman? At least the rapist's pursuit of
sexual freedom doesn't [in most cases] result in anyone's death." The
last two decades of Republican policies on birth control, sex education,
and abortion strongly suggest that the party's faithful regard rape as
either uncommon or not very serious.'
It is all the more interesting to observe, then, how rape has recently
figured in the rhetoric of rightwing Republican figures when the topic is
not reproductive rights or sexual health, but "self-defense." In a 2012
editorial, for example, Florida father-and-son politicians Don and Matt
Gaetz attacked critics of the controversial "Stand Your Ground" self-
defense laws as "anti-woman."4 The paradigmatic scenario they invoked
1. Stephen D. Foster, Jr, The Party of Rape Culture: 40 Republican Quotes We All Should
Remember in November, ADDICTING INFO (July 16, 2013, 1:21 AM), http://www.addictinginfo.
org/2013/07/16/the-party-of-rape-culture-40-republican-rape-quotes-everyone-should-remember/.
2. Garance Franke-Ruta, A Canard That Will Not Die: 'Legitimate Rape' Doesn't Cause
Pregnancy, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2012/08/a-canard-that-will-not-die-legitimate-rape-doesnt-cause-pregnancy/261303/.
3. Robin Abcarian, 'Rape Insurance,' A New Front in the GOP's Clueless 'War on Women,'
L.A.TIMEs (Dec. 12, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/12/local/la-me-In-rape-insurance-
abcarian-20131212.
4. Peter Schorsch, Sen. Don Gaetz & Rep. Matt Gaetz Op-ed: Standing Up for "Stand Your
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against the critics of expanding self-defense laws was none other than a
vulnerable woman facing down a rapist:
Consider an elderly woman in a dimly lit parking lot or a college girl
walking to her dorm at night. If either was attacked, her duty was to
turn her back and try to flee, probably be overcome and raped or
killed. Prior to "Stand Your Ground," that victim didn't have the
choice to defend herself, to meet force with force. Calls to repeal
"Stand Your Ground" are anti-woman. Imposing a duty-to-flee places
the safety of the rapist above a woman's own life.'
The Gaetzes' statements could have been written by Marion Hammer,
whose lobbying efforts as the former president of the National Rifle
Association ("NRA") led to Florida becoming the first state to pass a
"Stand Your Ground" law in 2005.6 Like the Gaetzes, Hammer illus-
trated the need for Stand Your Ground by using rape as the paradigmatic
self-defense scenario:
The duty to retreat had been imposed by the system and essentially if
someone had tried to drag a woman into an alley to rape her, the
women [sic]-even though she might be licensed to carry concealed
and ready to protect herself, the law would not allow her to do it. It
required her to try to get away and run and be chased down by the
perpetrator before she could then use force to protect herself.'
According to this reasoning, people who do not support Stand Your
Ground laws are in favor of rape.
A similar sentiment could be observed in NRA Executive Vice
President Wayne LaPierre's speech at the Conservative Political Action
Conference in 2013, in which he singled out "young women" for the
following message: "the one thing a violent rapist deserves to face is a
good woman with a gun."' Fox News host Sean Hannity also jumped on
the right-wing rape bandwagon, expressing outrage at the "Left" for fail-
ing to acknowledge the supposed need for women to carry concealed
weapons to protect themselves against rape9 (this included criticizing an
actual rape victim, Zerlina Maxwell, for rejecting the supposed wisdom
Ground," SAlNTPETERSBLOG (May 2, 2012), http://www.saintpetersblog.com/sen-don-gaetz-rep-
matt-gaetz-op-ed-standing-up-for-stand-your-ground.
5. Id.
6. See A History of 'Stand Your Ground' Law in Florida, NPR (Mar. 20, 2012, 3:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/20/149014228/a-history-of-stand-your-ground-law-in-florida. Given
the tremendous influence of the NRA in Florida generally, and with regard to Stand Your Ground
in particular, there is a chance such statements might literally have been written by Hammer.
7. Interview with Marion Hammer, Ctr. for Individual Freedom (on file with author).
8. Daniel Blackman, Wayne LaPierre, Gun Salesman, HARv. POL. REV. (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/wayne-lapierre-gun-salesman/.
9. See Zerlina Maxwell, Zerlina Maxwell on Hannity: Giving Every Woman a Gun Is Not
Rape Prevention, YouTUBE (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9FTVjKohaFE#t=
130.
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of armed responses to rape-the response from many of the show's fans
included, with no apparent sense of irony, to say nothing of decency,
threats to rape her. 10)
It is not just Republican politicians, NRA leaders, and right-wing
pundits who hasten to give the impression that expansive definitions of
self-defense are written with vulnerable women in mind. Writing about
the legal evolution of the castle doctrine, according to which "true men"
are not obliged to retreat when protecting hearth and home, legal schol-
ars such as Jeannie Suk and Joshua Dressler suggest that laws like Stand
Your Ground treat battered women as the exemplars of self-defense. As
Suk puts it, the modem doctrine "bears the unmistakable traces of the
subordinated woman, now an indelible presence in the self-defense ter-
rain and in public understandings of crime. . . . the modem Castle Doc-
trine leverages the subordinated woman into a general model of self-
defense rooted in the imperative to protect the home and family from
attack."" For Republican politicians, gun lobbyists, and pundits, the
poster child for Stand Your Ground is the helpless rape victim; for Suk
and other legal scholars, it is the battered woman. But do Stand Your
Ground laws and other forms of escalated self-defense rhetoric actually
benefit women?
This Article will show that not only are Stand Your Ground laws
not written for the benefit of women, they actually reinforce and exacer-
bate existing gender divides in self-defense law that disproportionately
harm women. The cynical appropriation of women's right to self-
defense by Stand Your Ground supporters conceals the law's actual hos-
tility toward women's use of force, including its continued pathologiza-
tion of women who fight back. At the same time, the female
empowerment rhetoric of Stand Your Ground obscures the real achieve-
ment of the law: the normalization and promotion of (often white) male
violence in an increasing number of scenarios. Battered Women's Syn-
drome remains the chief narrative available to women who fight back,
and it is a narrative that forces women to plead for mercy, requiring
them to subject their behavior to extensive scrutiny and evaluation by
experts, lawyers, and juries. Stand Your Ground, the chief narrative by
which men can now justify provoking deadly fights, allows men in some
cases to escape evaluation altogether by granting them immunity from
prosecution and even from arrest. This two-track system of self-
defense-Battered Women's Syndrome for women and Stand Your
10. Imani Gandy, Zerlina Maxwell Braves Online Attacks and Abuse to Speak Out About
Rape Culture, RH REALrrY CHECK (Mar. 13, 2012), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/03/13/
zerlina-maxwell-braves-online-attacks-and-abuse-to-speak-out-about-rape-culture/.
11. Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARv. J.L. &
GENDER 237, 240 (2008).
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Ground for men-has far-reaching implications outside of the court-
room. The use of Battered Women's Syndrome frequently sends the
legal and social message that women should retreat even from their own
homes in the face of objective, repeated harm to their bodies; Stand
Your Ground sends the legal and social message that men can advance
against strangers anywhere on the basis of vague, subjective perceptions
of threats. Male violence is not only tolerated, but celebrated, whereas
women's violence is not only discouraged, but stigmatized. Invoking the
image of vulnerable women to promote aggressive self-defense rhetoric
serves to distract from the reality that violence remains chiefly a male
privilege. The sharp contrast between the treatment of George Zimmer-
man, who avoided arrest for six weeks after shooting an unarmed teen-
ager to death and who was eventually acquitted of all charges, and that
of Marissa Alexander, who was immediately arrested after firing what
she described as a warning shot at her abusive ex-husband and sentenced
to twenty years for aggravated assault with a firearm, offers a compel-
ling illustration of these principles.
II. CLARIFYING WHAT STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS ACTUALLY SAY
Before turning specifically to the female-empowerment rhetoric of
Stand Your Ground supporters, it is useful to examine the other claims
made about the necessity and desirability of the law. It is important to
clarify just what Florida's Stand Your Ground law actually says. In the
wake of the Michael Dunn and George Zimmerman trials, there has been
much confusion and heated disagreement about the role of Stand Your
Ground in violent confrontations. Many see the Florida law and others
like it as encouraging lethal responses to minor disputes, a particularly
worrisome feature when combined with racial tensions. Others claim
that Stand Your Ground laws merely provide necessary legal accommo-
dation to individuals acting in self-defense. The details of what the law
actually says and does tend to get lost amidst these opposing claims.
The first problem is figuring out what is actually meant by refer-
ence to "Stand Your Ground." The popular understanding seems to be
that Stand Your Ground refers to the section of the Florida law that
states that individuals have no duty to retreat from any place where they
have a "right to be."12 This is the aspect of the law that has received the
most attention in wake of the Trayvon Martin and Jordan Davis shoot-
ings. This provision, however, is not the radical departure from tradi-
tional self-defense principles that some seem to believe. That being said,
several other, often overlooked, aspects of Florida's revised self-defense
12. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013).
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law are gravely out of step of with traditional self-defense doctrine and
are grounds for alarm.
Prior to 2005, Florida self-defense law was very similar to the self-
defense law of most other states, which is modeled on the British com-
mon law of self-defense. Simply stated, common law self-defense did
not impose a blanket "duty to retreat" outside of the home. As Eugene
Volokh writes, "the duty to retreat has always been, at least in principle,
a narrow doctrine."" If one looks at the Model Penal Code's formula-
tion of the duty to retreat, for example, it is clear that "one doesn't lose
the right to lethal self-defense just because one could avoid the need for
lethal self-defense with complete safety. Rather, one loses this right only
when one could avoid the need for lethal self-defense with complete
safety and without undue sacrifice of one's liberty."14 Volokh provides
this example: "A typical 'duty to retreat' scenario would instead be
when there's a fistfight, and you fear serious bodily injury since even a
fistfight can cause such injury, but you can easily leave (for instance,
this is right outside your home, or a friend's home, and you can go
inside and close the door, or you're in your car and can just drive
away).""
The "meeting force with force" provision added in 2005 thus does
not in fact radically alter the duty to retreat outside the home; the histori-
cal duty to retreat does not come into play unless retreating can be
accomplished with complete safety.""6 However, Florida law did
impose, prior to 2005, a standard of "every reasonable means" to avoid
danger before a person could resort to deadly force: "[A] person may not
resort to deadly force without first using every reasonable means within
his or her power to avoid the danger, including retreat."' This puts
some limitation on the justification of the use of deadly force, though
just what qualifies as "reasonable means" is far from clear. It seems
clear that if George Zimmerman's and Michael Dunn's accounts of what
happened prior to the moment they shot their victims were true, they
would not have been prevented from using deadly force under either
general self-defense law or Florida's slightly more restrictive interpreta-
13. Eugene Volokh, Lethal Self-Defense, the Quantum of Proof the "Duty to Retreat," and
the Aggressor Exception, TiE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 24, 2012, 5:59 AM), http://www.
volokh.com/2012/03/24/lethal-self-defense-the-quantum-of-proof-the-duty-to-retreat-and-the-
aggressor-exception/.
14. Eugene Volokh, The "Duty to Retreat," the Duty (or Not) to Comply With Demands,
Necessity, and Liberty, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 3, 2012, 4:44 PM), http://www.
volokh.com/2012/04/03/the-duty-to-retreat-the-duty-or-not-to-comply-with-demands-necessity-
and-liberty/.
15. Volokh, Lethal Self-Defense, supra note 13.
16. Volokh, The 'Duty to Retreat,' supra note 14.
17. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999).
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tion. George Zimmerman claimed that Trayvon Martin was on top of
him slamming his head against the pavement;' if true, there would not
seem to be any reasonable means for Zimmerman to defend himself
other than to use his weapon. Similarly, Michael Dunn claimed that Jor-
dan Davis was either preparing to get out of the vehicle with a weapon
or to shoot at him from the vehicle." It is not likely that fleeing would
be considered a reasonable means of avoiding being fired upon.
It is not surprising, however, that critics of the "meeting force with
force" provision believe that Stand Your Ground is a radical departure
from traditional self-defense doctrine with regard to either the general
duty to retreat or Horida's particular interpretation of it. This confusion
can be largely credited to the law's proponents themselves. Recall the
claims made that supposedly demonstrate the need for Stand Your
Ground laws. According to the Gaetzes, before Stand Your Ground, a
woman threatened by a rapist had a duty "to turn her back and try to
flee, probably be overcome and raped or killed. Prior to 'Stand Your
Ground,' that victim didn't have the choice to defend herself, to meet
force with force."2 0 Marion Hammer similarly asserted that pre-Stand
Your Ground law imposed a duty to retreat on potential rape victims: "It
required her to try to get away and run and be chased down by the
perpetrator before she could then use force to protect herself."2 1 But
neither of these examples makes much sense. The Gaetzes claim that a
"college girl" attacked on her way to her dorm would be forced by the
previous law to "turn her back and try to flee, probably be overcome and
raped or killed." But if the victim reasonably fears that she will be raped
or killed, and if it is abundantly clear that fleeing will do nothing to
avoid being raped or killed, then fleeing would not be a "reasonable
means" of avoiding danger. Ditto Hammer's woman "dragged into an
alley." Neither the Gaetzes nor Hammer cite a case in which a victim
used deadly force against a rapist and was denied a self-defense instruc-
tion on the basis of a duty to retreat.
In other words, to the extent that the Stand Your Ground provision
of Florida's self-defense law merely clarifies the authorization of the use
of deadly force anywhere if one reasonably believes it is necessary in
order to avoid serious bodily injury or death, it is cause for neither par-
ticular praise nor alarm-it is just an explicit statement of traditional
self-defense in this country. It is neither the desperately necessary
18. Mary Anne Franks, Stand Your Ground's Woman Problem: Laws Expanding Self-Defense
Raise Questions About Gender as Well as Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-franks/stand-your-grounds-woman-_b4886650.html.
19. Id.
20. Schorsch, supra note 4.
21. Hammer, supra note 7.
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amendment that the law's proponents claim, nor is it the license to kill
that the law's critics often assume it to be.
That being said, the insistence that Stand Your Ground laws play
no role in recent deadly confrontations is disingenuous at best. Florida's
Stand Your Ground law, and the laws of other states modeled on Flor-
ida, does include several innovations that run contrary to traditional lim-
itations on self-defense.2 2 The first is an easily overlooked but
significant addition to the authorization of deadly force in "any place"
where one has a right be. As stated above, the majority of the provision
should not be seen as particularly controversial:
"[a] person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is
attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet
force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably
believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm
to himself or herself or another. ... "
But the provision goes on to include these words: "[O]r to prevent
the commission of a forcible felony."2 4 According to Florida law, forci-
ble felonies include robbery and burglary." This is a significant depar-
ture from the long-held belief that the use of deadly force should not be
used to protect mere property. Inasmuch as this belief reflects the princi-
ple that life is precious and should not be taken except under extraordi-
nary circumstances, this is an innovation that fosters disrespect for
human life. This authorization of the use of deadly force against the
commission of a "forcible felony" is repeated in another provision of the
Florida code, strangely titled "Use of Force in the Defense of Others."2 6
Second, Florida's law greatly expands the zone of the exception to
the duty to retreat, an exception known as the "castle doctrine." In tradi-
tional self-defense law, the "castle doctrine" stipulates that one is not
22. FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2013). "Stand Your Ground" laws, also sometimes referred to as
"Line in the Sand" or "No Duty to Retreat" laws have been passed in 26 states, many of them
modeled on Florida's "Stand Your Ground" statute, which was passed in 2005. "Stand Your
Ground" Policy Summary, LAW CENTER TO PREvENT GuN VIoLENcE (July 18, 2013), http://
smartgunlaws.org/stand-your-ground-policy-summary/.
23. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013).
24. Id.
25. See id. § 776.08.
26. See id. § 776.031. "A person is justified in the use of force, except deadly force, against
another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary
to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on, or other tortious or criminal interference with,
either real property other than a dwelling or personal property, lawfully in his or her possession or
in the possession of another who is a member of his or her immediate family or household or of a
person whose property he or she has a legal duty to protect. However, the person is justified in the
use of deadly force only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the
imminent commission of a forcible felony." (emphasis added).
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required to retreat from one's own home, even if it is possible to do so in
complete safety.2 7 Under Stand Your Ground, one is allowed to use
deadly force even when one could retreat in complete safety not only in
homes (the traditional view) but in any "dwelling," which is expansively
defined as "a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached
porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent,
mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is
designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night" as well as in
"occupied vehicles." 28
The law also includes several presumptions about what constitutes
a "reasonable fear" necessary to use deadly force within a dwelling: This
presumption exists "if the person against whom the defensive force was
used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had
unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehi-
cle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another
against that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied
vehicle." 9
But perhaps the most unsettling innovation of Florida's Stand Your
Ground law, the one that arguably does the most to shift social norms
away from a default position of respecting human life, is the provision
that provides immunity from criminal prosecution to those who claim
self-defense: "A person who uses force as permitted in s. 776.012, s.
776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in using such force and is immune
from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force....
As used in this subsection, the term 'criminal prosecution' includes
arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defen-
dant."o That means that a person who intentionally kills another person
may not only avoid having to demonstrate to a jury that they acted in
self-defense; he may avoid being arrested at all. Even if arrested, a killer
can request a special immunity hearing at which his claim of self-
defense need only meet a "preponderance of the evidence." 3 ' The impli-
cations of this are staggering: The weighty, complex determination
whether a person acted reasonably and justifiably in using deadly force
27. Self Defense and "Stand Your Ground," NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIs. (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-crirminal-justice/self-defense-and-stand-your-ground.aspx.
28. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(5)(a) (2013).
29. Id. § 776.013(1)(a).
30. Id. § 776.032(1).
31. Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ("[A] defendant may raise the
question of statutory immunity pretrial and, when such a claim is raised, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the immunity
attaches."). In Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme Court held that
the Peterson procedure "best effectuates the intent of the Legislature," making Peterson binding
on all Florida courts.
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may be disposed of by a police officer at the scene. Whether or not such
immunity is given in any particular case does not resolve the question of
the provision's influence on social understandings of justifiable force
and killing with impunity.
In sum, the significant alterations that Stand Your Ground makes to
self-defense law are the authorization of the use of deadly force to pro-
tect property; the extension of the castle doctrine to a broad category of
"dwellings" as well as "occupied vehicles;" presumptions about the rea-
sonableness of the use of deadly force; and immunity from arrest and
prosecution.
III. STAND YOUR GROUND IS NOT FOR WOMEN
Stand Your Ground rhetoric is very seductive, and perhaps particu-
larly to a feminist perspective. It is tempting to imagine Stand Your
Ground as applied to the most common threats of violence and aggres-
sion that women face. It is gratifying to imagine a world in which a
woman is legally and socially encouraged to face down a street harasser,
fight off a rapist, or stop an abusive partner in his tracks. No doubt this
is why Stand Your Ground proponents so often invoke the image of a
woman fighting back against a violent rapist in an alley.32
The choice of a stranger rape scenario is telling. Of all the interper-
sonal threats women and girls are likely to face in their lifetimes, includ-
ing street harassment, acquaintance rape, and domestic violence,
stranger rape is one of the rarest.3 3 The majority of rape victims-more
than two-thirds-are assaulted by someone they know.34 And the vast
majority of rapes do not take place in the street; they happen in houses,
apartments, cars, and dorm rooms.3 5 So, while it is convenient to imag-
ine a gun-toting woman thwarting a lurking rapist, such a scenario is
extremely statistically unlikely. Even in cases of stranger rape in alley-
ways, the odds that any person would be able to take out a weapon and
use it to successfully ward off an attack are vanishingly small.3 6 Unless
women are walking around with their guns on their hips and their fingers
32. Franks, supra note 18.
33. Id.
34. Statistics, RAINN, http://www.rainn.org/statistics (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
35. The Offenders, RAINN, http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/sexual-assault-
offenders (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
36. The fact that trained police officers miss the targets they are shooting at 70%-82% of the
time casts considerable doubt on the claim that armed civilians will be able to defend themselves
successfully from attack. See Nate Rawlings, Ready, Fire, Aim: The Science Behind Police
Shooting Bystanders, Tma (Sept. 16, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/09/16/ready-fire-aim-
the-science-behind-police-shooting-bystanders/.
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on the triggers, the chances of being able to use a weapon in self-defense
during a surprise attack are extremely slim.
And that is, of course, precisely why proponents of Stand Your
Ground, conservative pundits, and gun activists use the stranger rape
example. Its value is purely rhetorical. It allows proponents to claim
concern for women's safety, and even more importantly, to label oppo-
nents as "anti-woman," without actually challenging entrenched, daily
violence against women. It is utterly safe to condemn the stranger rap-
ist-he is an outlier, a monster; he has no legitimate authority and poses
as much (or more) of a threat to patriarchal interests than he does to
actual women. Stranger rapists have "real" victims, victims who are
virgins or married or are assigned some other strict role within the sex-
ual economy. Stranger rapists disrupt sexual order and destabilize men's
entitlement to and control over their wives, girlfriends, or daughters. The
stranger rapist can be vilified without indicting mainstream society.
Women who fight back against stranger rapists pose no threat to social
order or challenge cultural gender-disciplining norms. They do not, in
short, challenge the average man's authority or make him consider
whether he too is a legitimate target for violence.
It is clear, then, why in invoking rape as the paradigmatic scenario
to support Stand Your Ground, proponents have to conjure up the rarest
of all sexual assaults. If Stand Your Ground reforms were in fact driven
by real concerns for women's vulnerability, the paradigmatic rape scena-
rio would have been one that most women are likely to face: rape by
someone the victim knows and trusts-a husband, boyfriend, ex-partner,
friend, or family member, not in an alley but in a bedroom, a car, at a
party, in places where the victim probably felt safe. And how should she
stand her ground then? Should she carry her weapon to bed, to the col-
lege party, or to the car where her date is waiting-not just carry it but
have it in her hand, finger on the trigger, in the event that the conversa-
tion takes a surprising turn or the fondling goes farther than she wants?
This kind of application is clearly absurd, and yet when do women
need more encouragement to "stand their ground" than when someone
they love and trust attempts to violate their boundaries and ignore their
consent? There's no way to halt this with a gun, and "standing one's
ground" in such a context would have to mean relying on some support
from social and legal norms to give her refusal respect and weight. But
women are not encouraged to fight back against rapes by husbands, boy-
friends, friends, or acquaintances; instead, they are taught to anticipate
and minimize the chances for sexual assault by constraining their mobil-
37. Franks, supra note 18.
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ity, clothing choices, conduct, and recreational activity." The rhetoric of
acquaintance rape is not "stand your ground" but "retreat" from any hab-
its, preferences, or choices that might "lead to" rape.
Stand Your Ground, therefore, is unlikely to be useful to many
women with regard to rape, even in the rare stranger rape scenario that
the law's proponents exploit. It is telling that defenders of Stand Your
Ground also have not rallied behind women facing street harassment,
even though women are routinely subjected to abuse and threats while
"in a place where [they have] a right to be."39 If people are allowed to
"meet force with force" in such places, why aren't Stand Your Ground
proponents encouraging women to respond to sexual harassment in the
street, or groping on public transport, or being followed in a parking lot?
Why hasn't Stand Your Ground become a rallying cry for women to be
allowed to move about freely in the world? When politicians extol the
virtues of the law in press conferences and editorials, why do they not
praise this strong statement in favor of women's autonomy in public
spaces?
Perhaps this is just an oversight. Perhaps Stand Your Ground sup-
porters are more than happy for these laws to be used and interpreted
this way, but have merely not chosen to foreground these kinds of bene-
fits. The same cannot be said, however, of the benefits Stand Your
Ground might offer domestic violence victims. The provisions on the
use of justifiable force in the home, with its detailed presumptions, sug-
gest that the law might encourage battered spouses to fight back, or at
least protect them when they do. The statute even explicitly mentions
domestic violence, and does so in a way that might suggest (and has
been read to suggest40) protection for domestic violence victims.4' As it
turns out, however, Stand Your Ground laws are specifically not
intended to encourage domestic violence victims to fight back.
To understand this, we must again take a step back. As noted
above, Stand Your Ground is an extension of the so-called "castle doc-
trine." Under common law, the castle doctrine provided an exception to
the duty to retreat.4 2 That is, a person whose home is invaded has no
38. See, e.g., Katie McDonough, Sorry Emily Yoffe: Blaming Assault on Women's Drinking is
Wrong, Dangerous and Tired, SALON (Oct. 16, 2013, 1:36 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/10/
16/blaming-assault onwomens drinking-is tired-dangerousjrape-apology/.
39. Kavita B. Ramakrishnan, Inconsistent Legal Treatment of Unwanted Sexual Advances: A
Study of the Homosexual Advance Defense, Street Harassment, and Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 291, 318 (2011).
40. See Joshua Dressier, Feminist (or "Feminist") Reform of Self-Defense Law: Some
Critical Reflections, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 1475, 1483 (2010).
41. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(2)(a) (20013).
42. MARK RANDALL & HENDRIK DEBOER, OFFICE OF LEGIs. RESEARCH, THE CASTLE
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duty to retreat even if retreat in perfect safety is possible.4 3 It is not a
coincidence that the expansion of the "castle doctrine," including Stand
Your Ground laws, has often been referred to as the "True Man doc-
trine"-a privilege primarily reserved for men.
In the late nineteenth-century, American law expanded the doctrine
of self-defense and recognized the right to stand one's ground to kill
in self-defense, both in his home and anywhere he lawfully had a
right to be. Over time, this became known as the "True Man" doc-
trine and held that an individual is not required to retreat, even if he
can do so safely, when he has a reasonable belief that he is in immi-
nent danger of death or great bodily harm and is in a place where he
has a right to be."
The castle doctrine has long presented difficulties for domestic violence
cases, particularly domestic violence cases in which battered women kill
their husbands.4 5 One of the historic problems with the "castle doctrine"
is that it presumes situations in which a stranger violates the sanctity of
the home; such a conception obviously overlooks the situation of vio-
lence between cohabitants, in which victim and attacker share the same
"castle."" It is telling that the castle doctrine is rarely cited as a response
to, or preemption of, the inevitable question asked of battered women:
"why didn't she leave?"4 7 The castle doctrine, were it not so implicitly
gendered, would provide a ready response, namely that "she" should not
have to leave her own home to avoid violence. The very question, "Why
didn't she leave," reflects the starkly different ways that self-defense
concepts are applied to men and women. 48 It is difficult to imagine ask-
ing a man why he "didn't just leave" when an intruder broke into his
house and threatened him-so difficult, in fact, that the question is
effectively foreclosed by the castle doctrine. And yet the question is rou-
tinely asked of women who are attacked in their own homes.4 9
One reason that wives vis-a-vis husbands were historically
excluded from the benefits of the castle doctrine was the belief that a
DOCTRINE AND STAND-YOUR-GROUND LAW (2012), available at http://cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/2012-
R-0172.htm.
43. Id.
44. Katelyn E. Keegan, The True Man & the Battered Woman: Prospects for Gender-Neutral
Narratives in Self-Defense Doctrines, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 263 (2013).
45. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense,
86 MARQ. L. REv. 653, 657 (2003).
46. Id. at 670-71.
47. See Diane L. Rosenfeld, Why Doesn't He Leave? Restoring Liberty and Equality to
Battered Women, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 535, 542 (Catherine A.
MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
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woman's violence against her husband was a form of treason."o As lord
and master of the home, the man of the house was viewed as a kind of
king." Though modem law no longer explicitly adheres to this view,
strong traces of it remain in the decisions of many courts (of both law
and public opinion) to expect a woman to leave her home if she is being
abused. 5 2 In other words, while men, whose violent confrontations
inside the home are likely to involve strangers, are allowed to stand and
fight, women, whose violent confrontations inside the home are likely to
involve cohabitants, are effectively expected to retreat.
Several states, including Florida, in fact made this expectation
explicit. In State v. Bobbit, the Supreme Court of Florida held that "the
privilege not to retreat, premised on the maxim that every man's home is
his castle which he is entitled to protect from invasion, does not apply
here where both Bobbitt and her husband had equal rights to be in the
'castle' and neither had the legal right to eject the other."?4 In other
words, the court imposed a duty to retreat upon a person attacked in her
own home by a lawful cohabitant. The decision was strongly criticized
for the impact it would have on victims of domestic violence.
As Jeannie Suk argues, increasing awareness of domestic violence
has led to a movement away from the gendered norms of the castle doc-
trine, at least to a limited degree. According to Suk,
[the] recognition of the gendered impact of the castle doctrine began
to inform' change in self-defense law. Several castle doctrine states
that previously imposed on cohabitants a duty to retreat have, in the
last decade, through judicial interpretation, moved away from a duty
to retreat for cohabitants to a rule of no duty to retreat for cohabitants.
These state courts explicitly grounded their doctrinal shifts on a sym-
pathetic understanding of the dynamics of [domestic violence] and its
victims."
Suk argues that Stand Your Ground laws, in particular Florida's
law, explicitly takes note of domestic violence situations in a way that
50. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of
Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623, 628 (1980).
51. Suk, supra note 11, at 251-52 (stating "[t]he castle was a microcosm of the realm, and the
man of the castle was like the king. Thus, the idea of a wife killing her husband represented a
threat not only to a human life, but to the notion of being a subject who is governed-or put
another way, to being ruled by legal authority").
52. See generally Schneider, supra note 50.
53. Suk, supra note 11, at 252 (commenting that "[a]s courts have noted, imposing a duty to
retreat from cohabitants ... causes problems for battered women who stand their ground and kill
their batterers").
54. State v. Bobbit, 415 So. 2d 724, 726 (Fla. 1982), overruled by Weiand v. State, 732 So.
2d 1044 (Ha. 1999).
55. Suk, supra note 11, at 252.
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elevates the "subordinated woman" into the "True Man."5 6 Joshua
Dressler makes a similar claim: "Florida law (followed by some other
states) does provide explicit benefits to domestic violence victims, pre-
sumably usually women, in the home,"" leading him to conclude that
such laws stand for the (to him) troubling proposition that "some femi-
nists are Real Women, just like their Real Men comrades-in-arms." 8
This claim is odd for many reasons. The first is that to the extent that
Florida law has corrected its gender-biased castle doctrine, it has done so
through case law, not through legislative reform. In Weiand v. State, the
Florida Supreme Court overruled Bobbit, specifically noting the unjust
implications of that case for domestic violence victims. 59 The Court
quoted a passage from an article on domestic violence: "Imposition of
the duty to retreat on a battered woman who finds herself the target of a
unilateral, unprovoked attack in her own home is inherently unfair. Dur-
ing repeated instances of past abuse, she has 'retreated,' only to be
caught, dragged back inside, and severely beaten again. If she manages
to escape, other hurdles confront her. Where will she go if she has no
money, no transportation, and if her children are left behind in the 'care'
of an enraged man?"60
Florida's Supreme Court in 1999 thus moved to clarify and correct
the inherent gender bias in the "True Man" doctrine. Far from offering
further clarification, the 2005 Stand Your Ground law arguably creates
more confusion. According to the statute, the presumption of "reasona-
ble fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or
herself or another" that would justify deadly force only applies when
"the person against whom the defensive force was used was in the pro-
cess of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forci-
bly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person
had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person's
will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle," and "the person
who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful
and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had
occurred." 6 1 As noted above, in many domestic violence situations, both
parties have lawful residence in the home. A man who comes home at
night, has dinner, and then starts beating his wife has not "unlawfully
and forcefully entered" the home. The lack of presumption of reasona-
56. Id. at 271.
57. See Dressler, supra note 40, at 1484.
58. Id. at 1485.
59. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999).
60. Id. at 1053 (quoting Maryanne E. Kampmann, The Legal Victimization of Battered
Women, 15 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 101, 112-113 (1993)).
61. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a)-(b) (2013).
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bleness of deadly force against a lawful cohabitant is repeated in the
exceptions section of the statute: "[T]he presumption . . . does not apply
if: The person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to
be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such
as an owner, lessee, or titleholder." 62 In other words, domestic violence
victims generally will not benefit from the presumptions outlined in
Stand Your Ground.
So why do Suk and Dressler believe that the True Man doctrine
embraces the domestic violence victim? Because of an exception to an
exception; namely, because the law does allow for the presumption of
reasonableness in using deadly force against a cohabitant if that cohabi-
tant is subject to "an injunction for protection from domestic violence or
a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person." 63
By allowing this presumption, Suk argues, "the domestic abuser can be
treated just like a home intruder when he enters. He can be shot on
sight."64 Similarly, Dressler claims,
if a victim of domestic violence receives a protective order against
another person-including a spouse or live-in partner-and if that
person seeks to enter her or their home in violation of the protective
order-even if he is entering, for example, to pick up his belong-
ings-the legal presumption [of the Florida statute] . . . applies to the
woman living there. If she kills in these circumstances, the legal pre-
sumption is that she killed lawfully.65
There are two questions to ask here: one, whether the restraining order
exception is as significant for domestic violence victims as Suk and
Dressler believe it is, and two, whether the fact that a domestic abuser
"can be shot on sight" is a good or a bad thing.
As an initial matter, to interpret the protective order exception as
beneficial to domestic violence victims requires one to assume that pro-
tective orders are common, easily obtained, and timely. Neither Suk nor
Dressler offers evidence to support this assumption. 6 6 There are numer-
ous variables here: the fact that many domestic violence situations esca-
late suddenly; the reluctance of victims to seek protective orders out of
fear of escalation, financial dependency, or lack of knowledge; the fact
that courts do not issue protective orders simply because they are asked
to do so; and the time it takes to receive an order even under the best of
circumstances. 67 As Katelyn Keegan writes, "[t]he prerequisite of a pro-
62. Id. § 776.031(2)(a).
63. Id.
64. Suk, supra note 11, at 269.
65. Dressler, supra note 40, at 1484.
66. See generally id.; Suk, supra note 11.
67. Keegan, supra note 44, at 273.
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tective order is not always feasible or obtainable, but it is necessary
under the Florida law for women to treat their abusers the same as
intruders."6 8 Given that many battered spouses do not have protective
orders against their partners-at least not before their abusers try to kill
them-this provision hardly bolsters protections for domestic violence
victims.
Even if a battered spouse does have a protection order against a co-
habitant, it is not clear that the Florida law offers her any particular
benefit. The law states that the presumption of reasonableness in using
deadly force does not apply against a co-habitant against whom there is
no order of protection or no contact. That is not the same thing as stating
that there affirmatively is a presumption of reasonableness in using
deadly force against a co-habitant against whom one does have an order
of protection or no contact. The benefit here is at best ambiguous.
Given this, there seems to be little reason to believe that that the
2005 law accomplishes anything for the benefit of domestic violence
victims, to say nothing of elevating their status, as Suk and Dressler
claim it does. If anything, the law seems to undermine the clarity offered
by the Florida Supreme Court in Weiand. While one could certainly
argue that the court's 1999 decision has not gone far enough or been
applied enough to actually correct the longstanding gender bias in Flor-
ida's castle doctrine, there is no indication that the Stand Your Ground
law does anything to ameliorate this. In fact, there is much reason to
think the opposite.
The statements made by one of the law's chief architects militates
quite strongly against the conclusion that domestic violence victims are
either intended to or do in fact benefit from Stand Your Ground. In
describing what he considers to be the (dangerous) "feminization" of
self-defense through Stand Your Ground laws like Florida's, Dressler
claims that "the NRA and women's groups worked closely in alli-
ance."6 9 Dressler offers not so much as a footnote in support of this
assertion. It would be very surprising indeed if any such evidence exists,
considering the fact that Marion Hammer, when asked to verify that
Stand Your Ground was not intended to apply in domestic violence situ-
ations, answered, "[y]es." Hammer explained, "the law attempts to say
that if in a domestic violence situation you are being beaten you may use
self-defense, but you can't simply take action against an estranged
spouse who breaks into the home if they own the home. You have to be
under attack in those situations." 0 This idea of restraint is inconsistent
68. Id.
69. Dressler, supra note 40, at 1484.
70. Interview with Marion Hammer, supra note 7.
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with the rest of the Stand Your Ground ideology. A man can presume
that a stranger breaking into his house means him harm, and can thus use
deadly force against the stranger. A woman cannot presume that the man
who has been beating her or has threatened to kill her means her harm
unless he has entered her home unlawfully. Thus, she cannot use deadly
force against him until the moment he attacks her." Hammer elaborates
that this provision was the result of the drafters' effort to ensure "that in
restoring your self-defense rights and your right to protect your home
that they did not set up scenarios where people could murder people they
did not like and claim it was lawful self-defense."7 2 In other words, the
failure to comprehensively correct an actual, longstanding flaw in self-
defense-namely, the gender bias of Florida's castle doctrine-is no
mere oversight by Stand Your Ground architects. It is fully intended.
And this is the key to the gender divide in Stand Your Ground, and
what gives the lie to the claim that Stand Your Ground promotes gender
equality. Women threatened in their homes are at a distinct disadvantage
compared to men threatened in their homes, and also to men in any place
where they have a right to be. Stand Your Ground does in fact openly
assume, if not embrace, the risk of allowing individuals to 'murder peo-
ple they did not like and claim it was lawful self-defense,' even outside
of the home, so long as the killers are men (preferably white) and their
victims are strangers (preferably black)." What the law seems to refuse
to do-if we take its drafters at their word-is permit domestic violence
victims to fight back when threatened by a known abuser in their own
homes. To see this disadvantage, we need look no farther than the very
different treatment of Marissa Alexander and George Zimmerman, two
Florida cases involving Stand Your Ground.
IV. STAND YOUR GROUND v. BATTERED WOMEN'S SYNDROME
A. George Zimmerman
On February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman, a half-white, half-His-
panic man who fancied himself a neighborhood watchman, shot and
killed Trayvon Martin, an unarmed black teenager,74 as he walked
through a gated community in Sanford, Florida." Police called to the
scene took a statement from Zimmerman but declined to arrest him. 76
71. Franks, supra note 18.
72. Interview with Marion Hammer, supra note 7, emphasis added.
73. Franks, supra note 18.
74. See Dennis A. Henigan, The Woollard Decision and the Lessons of the Trayvon Martin
Tragedy, 71 MD. L. REv. 1188-89 (2012).
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Sanford Police Chief Bill Lee, facing a barrage of public criticism,
issued a statement claiming that the police were not allowed to arrest
Zimmerman given the immunity provision of Florida's self-defense law:
"[W]hen the Sanford Police Department arrived at the scene of the inci-
dent, Mr. Zimmerman provided a statement claiming he acted in self
defense, which at the time was supported by physical evidence and testi-
mony. By Florida Statute, law enforcement was prohibited from making
an arrest based on the facts and circumstances they had at the time.""
After six weeks of public outcry, Zimmerman was finally charged
with second-degree murder for shooting Trayvon Martin. Zimmerman
claimed at trial that Trayvon Martin attacked him, straddling him and
slamming his head repeatedly into the pavement." According to his
account, Zimmerman shot Martin because he was in fear for his life and
thought that Martin was reaching for Zimmerman's gun, though he
knew Martin was unarmed."
While Zimmerman did not seek a Stand Your Ground immunity
hearing as he had been expected to do, Stand Your Ground was the
reason given by Sanford Police for why Zimmerman was not arrested
for so long, and Stand Your Ground language was also used in the
instructions to the jury and seems to have influenced the jury's decision
to fully acquit George Zimmerman.80
77. Herald Staff, Chief Bill Lee Answers Questions About Investigation into Shooting of 17-
year-old Trayvon Martin, SANFORD HERALD (Mar. 17, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://mysanfordherald.
com/view/mobile full-story/17920337/article-Chief-Bill-Lee-answers-questions-about-
investigation-into-shooting-of-17-year-old-Trayvon-Martin (emphasis added).
78. Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Killing of Trayvon Martin,
N.Y. TU Es (July 14, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-
trayvon-martin.html?pagewanted=all& _r-0.
79. Id.
80. See Marc Caputo, Juror: We Talked Stand Your Ground Before Not-Guilty Zimmerman
Verdict, MiAmi HERALD (July 18, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/07/16/350248 1/juror-
we-talked-stand-your-ground.html. Later that same year, again in Florida, a 45-year-old white
man named Michael David Dunn fired a weapon ten times into an SUV with four young black
men inside, killing 17-year-old Jordan Davis. Dunn had argued with the teens about the volume of
their music while he and the teenagers were parked at a gas station. Dunn claims that Davis
threatened him with what he thought was a shotgun, and so grabbed his gun from the glove
compartment and shot at the vehicle four times. As the young men backed the SUV out of the gas
station in a panic, Dunn fired at them five more times. No weapon was ever found in the vehicle
or in the surrounding area. Dunn's lawyer at the time indicated that her client feared for his life:
"all he sees are heavily tinted windows, which are up and the back windows which are down, and
the car has at least four black men in it." Michael Dunn was convicted of three counts of second-
degree attempted murder and one count of firing into an occupied vehicle, but the jury deadlocked
on the first-degree murder charge for killing Jordan Davis. See Fred Grimm, Michael Dunn Case
Highlights Squishy Stand Your Ground Law, MiAmi HERALD (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.
mianiherald.com/2014/02/22/3953095/fred-grimm-dunn-case-highlights.html.
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B. Marissa Alexander
On August 1, 2010, Marissa Alexander, a 31-year old African-
American woman, was showing her estranged husband Rico Gray pic-
tures of their newly born child on her cell phone." When Alexander got
up to use the bathroom of their shared home, Gray began looking at text
messages on Alexander's phone.82 Upon finding some messages from
Alexander's ex-husband, Gray flew into a rage." Gray blocked Alexan-
der from leaving the bathroom, calling her a "whore" and a "bitch" and
telling her, "[i]f I can't have you, nobody [is] going to have you."8 4
Alexander told Gray to leave. He refused, and Alexander struggled to
get past him to leave through the garage.85 Once in the garage, however,
she realized that the door would not open.86 She grabbed her gun from
her truck and returned to the kitchen. There, she says, Gray threatened
her life.88 Alexander said she fired the shot into the ceiling as a way to
scare Gray off.8 9
Rico Gray had been arrested twice before on misdemeanor charges
of domestic battery and Alexander had obtained a protective order
against him.9 o In a sworn deposition, Gray himself verified that Alexan-
der's version of events that day was true,91 though he later changed his
story. 92 Gray admitted to having attacked Alexander before, including
once when he pushed her so hard that she fell backward and hit her head
on the bathtub.9 3 Gray also admitted that he had previously told Alexan-
der that he would find someone to hurt her if she did not do as he
wanted.9 4 He also stated that he was a habitual abuser of women:
I got five baby mammas and I put my hands on every last one of
them except for one.. . . I physically abused them; physically, emo-
tionally, you know, it's like- . . . Me, the way I was with women,
81. Deposition of Rico Gray at 15, State v. Alexander, No. 2010-CF-8579 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
2010).
82. Id. at 16.
83. Id. at 16-17.
84. Id. at 18-19.
85. Id. at 25.
86. Id. at 26.
87. Id. at 27.
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id.
90. See Tour6, Where's 'Stand Your Ground' for Marissa Alexander?, TIME (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/30/where-was-stand-your-ground-for-marissa-alexander/.
91. See Deposition of Rico Gray, supra note 81.
92. Lauren Victoria Burke, Exclusive: Marissa Alexander's Current Husband Speaks,
PoLc365 (Apr. 19, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://politic365.com/2012/04/19/exclusive-marissa-
alexanders-current-husband-speaks/.
93. Deposition of Rico Gray, supra note 81, at 10.
94. Id. at 19.
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they was like they had to walk on eggshells around me. You know
they never knew what I was thinking, what I might say.. . .Or what I
might do.95
He also stated that he told Alexander that "if she ever cheated on [him,
he] would kill her."96
Alexander tried to claim immunity under Stand Your Ground, but
was denied." She was charged with three counts of aggravated assault
(one for Gray and the other two for Gray's two sons who were also in
the home at the time Alexander fired the gun).98 After deliberating for
eleven minutes, the jury sentenced Alexander to twenty years in
prison." On appeal, a judge found that Alexander was entitled to a new
trial because the jury was improperly instructed regarding self-
defense.'" The judge maintained, however, that the denial of Alexan-
der's motion for immunity under Stand Your Ground was correct.101
While Alexander's lawyer has requested a new Stand Your Ground
hearing,0 2 it seems most likely that Alexander will have to rely on Bat-
tered Women's Syndrome as a way to explain and defend her actions.
C. Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat
George Zimmerman advanced upon a stranger who was in public
and not engaged in any unlawful activity. That confrontation ended with
Zimmerman killing the teenager. Zimmerman avoided arrest for nearly
six weeks based on Stand Your Ground and was eventually acquitted by
a jury of all charges."' Marissa Alexander responded to a confrontation
in her own home from a man against whom she had a protective
order." This man had beaten and threatened to kill her on numerous
prior occasions, and he was refusing to leave and attempting to prevent
Alexander from leaving. That confrontation ended with Alexander firing
95. Id. at 36.
96. Id. at 60.
97. See Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185, 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
98. Id. at 1190.
99. Julia Dahl, Fla. Woman Marissa Alexander Gets 20 Years for "Warning Shot": Did She
Stand Her Ground?, CBS Naws (May 16, 2012, 4:21 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fla-
woman-marissa-alexander-gets-20-years-for-warning-shot-did-she-stand-her-ground/.
100. Alexander, 121 So. 3d at 1189. Gary Fineout, Marissa Alexander, Woman Sentenced to
20 Years for Firing Warning Shot, Gets New Trial, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2013, 3:27 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/marissa-alexander-new-trial-n_3995869.html.
101. Alexander, 121 So. 3d at 1186.
102. Irin Carmon, Can Women Stand Their Ground? Depends on the Target, MSNBC (Mar.
20, 2014, 3:05 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/can-women-stand-their-ground.
103. Meghan Keneally, Associated Press, George Zimmerman Found Not Guilty and Goes
Free, ABC NEWs (July 13, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-found-guilty-
free/story?id=19653300.
104. It is not clear whether there was a protective order in place at the time of the shooting.
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a shot that neither killed nor injured anyone. She was arrested immedi-
ately, denied Stand Your Ground immunity, tried, and sentenced to
twenty years.
Many argue that George Zimmerman's case was not about Stand
Your Ground. 05 To the extent that Zimmerman did not seek a Stand
Your Ground hearing, that is correct. But Zimmerman did initially
receive complete immunity, which is the first effect that Stand Your
Ground can have on a putative defendant. Sanford police explicitly
stated that they did not arrest Zimmerman right after the shooting
because of Stand Your Ground.106 Had it not been for the media outcry
following Trayvon Martin's death, it is possible that Zimmerman would
never have been charged. His "traditional self-defense" argument at trial
is inextricable from Stand Your Ground provisions, as Stand Your
Ground is not a specific amendment to self-defense law, but an overall
revision of self-defense law.107 This is why Stand Your Ground lan-
guage was included in the jury instructions in Zimmerman's case. In
other words, Stand Your Ground did influence Zimmerman's case.
Conversely, when the police arrested Marissa Alexander immedi-
ately after her altercation with her estranged husband, they were effec-
tively denying her Stand Your Ground status. Defendants who do not
have the luxury of being determined justified by the police can raise
Stand Your Ground at a preliminary hearing, which Alexander did. Her
request was denied, and Alexander was not allowed to raise it as a
defense at her trial.o This is despite the fact that, if one takes seriously
the claims of Suk and Dressler, Marissa Alexander should be the ideal
Stand Your Ground figure. 109 She was a domestic violence victim, and
had, at least in the past, a protective order against her husband and he
had threatened her with great bodily injury. In addition she, unlike Zim-
merman, repeatedly tried to retreat. It was only at the moment that she
realized she physically could not retreat, and that her husband was
threatening her life, that she fired what she characterized as a warning
shot, even though a person in her circumstances ostensibly had the right
to use deadly force under Florida's law.110 At the time of this writing,
Marissa Alexander is still awaiting a new trial. When it begins, she will
105. Dan Abrams, No, Florida's Stand Your Ground Law Did Not Determine Either
Zimmerman or Dunn Cases, ABC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/floridas-
stand-ground-law-determine-zimmerman-dunn-cases/story?id=22543929.
106. The Role of "Stand Your Ground" in Zimmerman Trial, CBS MIAWi (Jul. 14, 2013, 4:09
PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/07/14/the-role-of-stand-your-ground-in-zimmerman-trial/.
107. See supra Part II.
108. See Alexander, 121 So. 3d at 1186.
109. See Suk, supra note 11, at 271 (noting that the "woman who kills the abuser-intruder
emerges as a kind of 'true woman."').
110. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013).
1120 [Vol. 68:1099
REAL MEN ADVANCE, REAL WOMEN RETREAT
be compelled to provide a narrative dominated by Battered Women's
Syndrome evidence rather than a Stand Your Ground claim.
In theory, Battered Women's Syndrome (BWS) can be used as evi-
dence to provide support for any self-defense claim, including Stand
Your Ground. Self-defense doctrine provides a justification for the use
of what would normally be considered unlawful force. "As a general
rule, a defendant makes out a claim of self-defense when he shows that
he was confronted by a serious threat of bodily harm or death, the threat
was imminent, and his response was both necessary and proportion-
ate.""1 ' In some jurisdictions, as discussed above, there is a "duty to
retreat" before a person resorts to deadly force.1 12
Battered women who kill their abusers face several challenges in
claiming self-defense. First, as many feminist legal scholars have
observed, traditional self-defense doctrine is predicated on male experi-
ence. 11 As such, the doctrine is a poor fit for the dynamics of repeated
violence between intimates that may be greatly mismatched in terms of
size, strength, and willingness to use force. Many judges and jurors have
prejudicial views of domestic violence victims, often faulting these vic-
tims for continued interactions with their abusers. The imminence
requirement, as traditionally interpreted, also presents serious obstacles
for women who kill sleeping or otherwise incapacitated abusers.
Introducing expert evidence on the effects of battering on victims is
useful to dispel stereotypes about how victims should and do react to
violence, including what many experts believe is victims' accuracy in
assessing the lethality and imminence of threats.114 In practice, however,
evidence of Battered Woman's Syndrome "risks advancing a stereotypi-
cal and pathological characterization of battered women. This represen-
tation risks not only negating claims advanced by women whose
experiences deviate from the BWS standard, but is likely to be inconsis-
tent with a defense that requires a determination of reasonableness in
order to be successful." 15 That is, BWS evidence may very well work at
cross-purposes with self-defense claims.116
111. Nourse, supra note 48, at 1239.
112. See supra Part II.
113. See Cheryl A. Tarrance et al., Expert Testimony in Cases Involving Battered Women Who
Kill: Going Beyond the Battered Woman Syndrome, 88 N.D. L. REv. 921, 927 (2012).
114. See Joan H. Krause, Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who Kill: A Response to
Professor Dressler, 4 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 555, 563 (2007) ("There is ample literature to suggest
that a battered woman may in fact be accurate in predicting an imminent threat of such harm from
a sleeping abuser.").
115. Tarrance, supra note 113, at 922.
116. This is not a criticism of BWS evidence as such, but of the way that such evidence tends
to be interpreted by judges and juries. BWS evidence, when used carefully and correctly, can
provide "a solid foundation for expert testimony in cases involving battered women." Mary Ann
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When Battered Women's Syndrome evidence is considered
towards a defense, it is often on very different terms than Stand Your
Ground. Stand Your Ground is a justification defense, meaning that
those who claim it successfully are considered not merely to have done
nothing wrong, but to have done something right."' By contrast, Bat-
tered Women's Syndrome is often treated as an excuse defense, which,
though it may also yield an acquittal or reduced sentence, expresses the
judgment that the defendant acted wrongly, but is so defective in some
significant sense that she cannot be held accountable for her own
actions."" As Joan Krause writes,
the vision offered by BWS is one of dysfunction. Much of the prob-
lem may be due to the characterization of BWS as a "syndrome." The
invocation of a medical-psychological model may have hastened the
acceptance of BWS expert testimony by judges, but it did so at the
expense of women's rationality: trapped by the cycle of violence, the
BWS victim mistakenly believes that she is helpless to change her
situation and thus fails to comprehend viable alternatives that would
be obvious to the average person.119
Stand Your Ground defendants engender admiration; Battered
Women's Syndrome defendants plead for mercy on the basis of what is
essentially considered a psychological defect.12 0 The narrative that Alex-
ander will be compelled to relate is one of a helpless woman who felt
she had no choice but to use deadly force against her abuser, whereas
Zimmerman is able to invoke the narrative of a man standing up for
himself against a violent interloper. Women who fight back against
known abusers are not valorized; in fact, their use of force actively
Dutton, Critique of the "Battered Woman Syndrome" Model, AM. AcAD. OF EXPERTS IN
TRAUMAnc STRESS, http://www.aaets.org/articlel38.htm (last visited May 6, 2014).
117. See Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the
Literature, in CASES AND MATERIALS ON CR1 INAL. LAw 483, 484 (5th ed. 2009).
118. Id. at 484-487 ("In its simplest form, and subject to substantial complexity and debate as
to its precise contours, justified conduct is conduct that is 'a good thing, or the right or sensible
thing, or a permissible thing to do.' . . . To say that conduct is justified is to suggest that something
which ordinarily would be considered wrong or undesirable-i.e., that would constitute 'social
harm,'-is, in light of the circumstances, socially acceptable or tolerable. A
justification . . . negates the social harm of an offense. An excuse is in the nature of a claim that
although the actor has harmed society, she should not be blamed or punished for causing that
harm . . . . Whereas a justification negates the social harm of an offense, an excuse negates the
moral blameworthiness of the actor for causing the harm.").
119. Krause, supra note 114, at 566.
120. Keegan, supra note 44, at 279 ("[T]he gender bias in BWS increases the likelihood that
the jury will merely excuse the woman's conduct, but find it unjustified under the law. When a
defense is treated as an excuse rather than a justification, the jury views.the defendant's act as
wrong and only tolerable because of her mental or emotional state. Conversely, justified conduct
is encouraged under the law, and the jury approves of the defendant's act because of the
surrounding circumstances." (footnotes omitted)); see also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MicH. L. REv. 1, 13 (1991).
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works against them when they seek help from the legal system.121 By
contrast, men who exert force against strangers are viewed as "true
men."1 22
Moreover, Battered Women's Syndrome by its nature requires
extensive expert evidence and findings. In this sense it stands in marked
contrast to the way Stand Your Ground claims often operate with regard
to burdens of proof. As discussed above, if law enforcement determines
that a person has acted according to Stand Your Ground, the person is
not arrested, let alone not prosecuted. That means that no examination,
whatsoever, of the person who used deadly force takes place beyond an
initial police interrogation-no presentation of evidence, no hiring of
lawyers and experts, and no loss of liberty. By contrast, there are no
comparable immunity procedures for the Battered Women's Syndrome
defense, and the defense requires extensive evidentiary findings, expert
testimony, and an intense evaluation of the defendant's life. As Keegan
explains,
Both [Battered Women's Syndrome] and the True Man doctrine are
theories of self-defense that address similar issues of imminence and
necessity, but each theory tells a completely different story. The pro-
cess of proving a true man self-defense claim is also strikingly dis-
similar to a BWS claim, as true men can testify upfront without
expert testimony, without state-mandated psychological evaluations,
and without pleading an insanity defense. With this evidentiary bur-
den placed on BWS defenses, the law adopted a model for women's
defense strategies that was essentially based on psychological
defects. 123
One self-defense rule for men, another for women: This distinction
did not begin with Stand Your Ground. Long before Stand Your Ground
laws were officially in place, the notorious case of Bernhard Goetz illus-
trated society's tolerance for male violence against strangers (again
minority males) in non-lethal situations. 124 On a New York City subway
train in 1984, Goetz was approached by four young black men. One said
to Goetz, "[g]ive me five dollars." 125 None of the teenagers displayed
any weapons. 1 2 6 Goetz, who was carrying an unlicensed .38 loaded with
121. See generally Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman?
When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (2008).
122. Keegan, supra note 44, at 263.
123. Id. at 280. "True men are empowered to use deadly force even in public without a duty to
retreat, while battered women must provide expert testimony on her psychological condition to
prove the reasonableness of her use of deadly force in light of her extreme helplessness." Id. at
282.
124. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
125. Id. at 43.
126. Id.
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five rounds, responded by firing four shots, carefully aiming at each of
the four men. 127 He missed his last target. Upon realizing this, Goetz
said to the young man, "[y]ou seem to be all right, here's another," and
shot him again, severing his spinal cord. 12 8 Goetz then jumped on the
train tracks and fled the scene.129
Goetz was charged with attempted murder and assault and argued
that he acted in self-defense.13 0 He claimed that he started carrying his
illegal handgun after being injured in a mugging three years prior.13 1
Goetz testified that before any of the men approached him, he knew
from the smile on one of the men's faces that "they wanted to play with
me."l 32 He testified that he did not believe that any of the men had a
gun.133 According to Goetz, "[i]f I was a little more under self-control
... I would have put the barrel against his forehead and fired.... If I
had had more [bullets], I would have shot them again, and again, and
again." 34 He also noted that before he started shooting, he planned out
his "pattern of fire," and stated that his intention in shooting the four
men was to "murder, . . . hurt, [and] make them suffer."13 Goetz was
acquitted of all charges except for possession of a concealed weapon, for
which he was sentenced to one year and served eight months.136
Compare Goetz's case to that of Judy Norman.' 3 ' For more than
twenty years, John Thomas Norman ("J.T.") subjected his wife, Judy, to
beatings, rapes, forced prostitution, threats of mutilation and death,
threats to family and friends, and humiliating treatment including forc-
ing her to bark like a dog and eat out of dog bowls.1 38 Two days before
Judy Norman's final confrontation with her husband, he unleashed a
series of particularly vicious attacks on Judy that led to her attempted
suicide."' When paramedics arrived at their home, J.T. tried to stop
127. Id.
128. Id. at 44.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 43.
131. Id. at 44.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 44 (internal quotation omitted).
135. Id. at 44.
136. 2 Scorr PATRICK JOHNSON, TRIALS OF THE CENTURY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR
CULTURE AND THE LAw 540 (2011). One of Goetz's victims, James Ramseur, was found dead as
the result of an apparent suicide on December 22, 2011, "27 years to the day after he was shot by
[Goetz]." Goetz's attorney, Darnay Hoffman, committed suicide in 2009. John Del Signore, Man
Shot by Bernhard Goetz Found Dead After Apparent Suicide, GoTHAMIST (Dec. 23, 2011, 9:37
AM), http://gothamist.com/2011/12/23/manshotbybernhard-goetz-foundde.php.
137. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
138. Id. at 10, 17.
139. Id. at 19.
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them from helping Judy, telling them to "[1]et the bitch die.""o The fol-
lowing day, Judy told her husband about the possibility of having him
committed, and he responded, "[i]f you do, I'll see them coming and
before they get here, I'll cut your throat."l 4 ' That day he subjected Judy
to repeated beating, threats to kill and maim her, and made her sleep on
the floor. 142 At some point Judy went to her mother's house, took a gun
from her mother's purse, went back to her house, and shot her sleeping
husband three times in the back of the head.143 At trial, Judy requested a
jury instruction of self-defense."'
As discussed above, according to common law, a person can use
deadly force in self-defense only when it is necessary, proportionate, and
the danger is imminent.14 5 At Norman's trial, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina overturned a lower court ruling that had allowed Norman
to receive a jury instruction on self-defense, holding that she did not
have "a reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm."l 4 6
According to the court, Norman was "not faced with an instantaneous
choice between killing her husband or being killed or seriously
injured. . . . [she] had ample time and opportunity to resort to other
means of preventing further abuse by her husband."' 47 The court main-
tained that she had "other means" available despite the fact that her hus-
band had warned her that he would kill her "before [the cops] get here,"
that he had threatened her family, that following an arrest and a few days
in jail for a DUI he beat Judy even more severely, and that Judy's
mother had called the police the day of the shooting, but they never
arrived.' 4 8
The court seemed to fear that finding Norman's actions justified
would encourage women to kill their husbands at the slightest opportu-
nity. This is despite the fact that women rarely kill their abusers, and
even more rarely kill abusers in non-confrontational situations, 49
despite persistently high rates of domestic violence.5 0 To grant Norman
an instruction on self-defense, the court claimed,
[w]ould tend to categorically legalize the opportune killing of abusive
140. Id.
141. Id. at 20.
142. Id. at 11.
143. Id. at 11, 13.
144. Id. at 9.
145. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAw 507-09 (5th ed.
2009).
146. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 9.
147. Id. at 13.
148. Id. at 11.
149. See Krause, supra note 114, at 556.
150. Id. at 572.
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husbands by their wives solely on the basis of the wives' testimony
concerning their subjective speculation as to the probability of future
felonious assaults by their husbands. Homicidal self-help would then
become a lawful solution, and perhaps the easiest and most effective
solution, to this problem.s15
As Justice Martin noted in dissent, however, any self-defense claim
raises the possibility of invented evidence, and the record in Norman's
case "contain[ed] no reasonable basis to attack the credibility of evi-
dence for the defendant." 15 2
The law's treatment of Judy Norman is a striking contrast to the
treatment of Bernhard Goetz, and the two cases bear strong similarity to
the differential treatment of the Marissa Alexander and George Zimmer-
man cases. A woman who shot the man that had terrorized, beaten, pros-
tituted, and threatened her for twenty years was denied a jury instruction
on self-defense and convicted of voluntary manslaughter, whereas a man
who shot (with intent to kill) four young men with whom he had no
prior relationship was granted a self-defense instruction and acquitted of
attempted murder and assault.' 5 3
V. CONCLUSION
Stand Your Ground's normalization and praise of male violence
against strangers on the one hand, and Battered Women's Syndrome's
pathologization and condemnation of female violence against known
abusers on the other make a toxic combination. Its influence is not lim-
ited to divergent outcomes in cases that go to trial. It offers reassurance
and encouragement to men who would not only initiate violent
encounters with strangers in public places, but also those who attack
their wives in the privacy of their own homes. It reinforces a quasi-right
for men to advance far from their homes to start fights, and a quasi-duty
for women to retreat from their own homes instead of fighting back.15 1
In other words, the Stand Your Ground/Battered Women's Syndrome
151. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 15. Though the court obviously wished to sound a cautionary note
in claiming that homicidal help would become the "easiest and most effective solution" to the
problem of severe and prolonged domestic abuse, one way of stating my argument is to say that
this claim is exactly right-not only descriptively, but normatively.
152. Id. at 16 (Martin, J., dissenting). See also Woman Who Killed Abusive Husband Freed by
Martin, STAR-NEWS (July 8, 1989), http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1454&dat=198907
08&id=Br8sAAAAIBAJ&sjid=VhQEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4797,2865037 (noting that Governor of
North Carolina, Jim Martin, commuted Judy Norman's six-year sentence).
153. B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us Part: A Comparative Law Approach to Justifying
Lethal Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1991 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 169 (1991).
154. See Nourse, supra note 48, at 1284-85 ("To ask of battered women that they leave-in
whatever doctrinal guise (imminence, retreat, threat, etc.)-raises serious questions about whether
the law of self-defense treats battered women less favorably than others.").
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axis offers strong reinforcement of the status quo: A world in which
white male interests are at the top of the hierarchy, and everyone else's
is somewhere below.'5 5 It offers more power to the already powerful,
immunity to the already protected, and reproach for any woman who
tries to act like a man.
Small wonder, then, that Angela Corey, the prosecutor in Marissa
Alexander's case, used the following terms to condemn Marissa Alexan-
der: "She was angry" when she fired the warning shot, "[s]he was not in
fear."l 56 (As if it were not possible to be both angry and afraid, and as if
a woman does not have a right to be angry after being beaten and
threatened in her own home by a man who refuses to leave.) At the same
time, Stand Your Ground proponents would have us believe that George
Zimmerman was afraid, not angry, when he shot and killed an unarmed
teenager who had not so much as spoken to Zimmerman before the
confrontation.
Much excellent work has already been done to explore how Stand
Your Ground activates both conscious and unconscious racism, raising
serious concerns that the law encourages white men in particular to see
danger where they see blackness and to be found justified for doing
so.'5 7 Less well-examined is the gendered effects that Stand Your
Ground, in conjunction with Battered Women's Syndrome, have on law
and society. Given the overwhelming rates of male violence against
women as compared to female violence against men, any just evolution
of self-defense law would need to address this imbalance by discourag-
ing gratuitous male violence and encouraging responsive female vio-
lence. Instead, Stand Your Ground re-entrenches gender norms to
restrain women's use of force even as men's use of force expands. The
father-and-son Stand Your Ground defenders, Don and Matt Gaetz, con-
clude their editorial with this stinging rebuke:
Those who use every tragedy as an excuse to water down our right to
keep and bear arms are already exploiting Trayvon Martin's death for
their own purposes. . . . [W]e will remind the critics and the cynics
why this law is necessary, who it protects, and, if it were repealed,
whose side the Legislature would be taking in that dimly-lit parking
155. On racial disparities in Stand Your Ground, see Lisa Wade, White Men's Freedoms and
Black Men's Lives, SOCIETY PAGES (Feb. 16, 2014, 10:38 PM), http://thesocietypages.org/
socimages/2014/02/16/white-mens-freedoms-and-black-mens-lives/.
156. Trymaine Lee, Marissa Alexander, Mom Facing 20 Years, Shot at Abusive Husband in
Anger, Prosecutor Says, HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2012, 9:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/05/09/marissa-alexander-prosecutor_n_1504428.html.
157. See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic,
98 IOWA L. REv. 293 (2012); see also Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and
Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REv. 1555 (2013); see also Anita
Bernstein, What's Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 655 (2013).
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lot or that darkened college dormitory."'
But the truth is that the solemn invocation of the "dimly-lit parking lot
or that darkened college dormitory" is a cheap and dishonest cover for
the law's hostility to women's use of force, and the real intended impact
of Stand Your Ground is exemplified by a man shooting an unarmed
black teenager walking home.
158. Schorsch, supra note 4.
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